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Diplomatic Normalization between the US and Cuba in Light of Recent Changes in US
Foreign Policy More Generally
Ethan Zawatsky
Ashley Gemma
May 1, 2015
We analyze normalization of diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba. We
first examine the causes of previous normalizations with Vietnam and China.
From these cases, we identify factors that are key to the normalization process.
These include political turnover, economic interests, other special interest
groups, public sentiment, and what we refer to as the Lawnmower Effect. This
effect is observed when one or both nations attempt to reopen diplomatic ties
only to continually fail to establish relations due to the endurance of underlying
political issues. We use the Multiple Streams Framework (a policy formulation
theory) in order to evaluate this normalization process. In this framework,
moments known as "policy windows" (opportunities in which the “streams” of
politics, problems, and policies come together) focus attention and resources on
an issue. In the case of US-Cuban relations, the three streams have come
together to create a policy window, due partially to international pressure. We
conclude with an evaluation of the current state and progress of the US-Cuban
normalization process.

1

Section 1: How did the US-Cuban relationship become abnormal?
In January 1961 the United States embassy in Cuba closed its doors, and US-Cuban
relations, politically and economically, essentially ceased to exist. Before December
17th, 2014, the United States and Cuba existed as close geographic neighbors without
any diplomatic relations. Cuba is only 90 miles off the coast of Florida, approximately a
40 minute plane ride, and yet politically relations between the two countries could not be
further apart. So why, after nearly 53 years without diplomatic relations, does there exist
a strong push to normalize US-Cuba relations now? Will this attempt at establishing
normalized relations be successful, or will it meet the same fate as past attempts? In
order to understand the process of normalization between the US and Cuba,
understanding how these relations became abnormal is of crucial importance.
The relationship between Cuba and the United States was not always so tumultuous
and antagonistic, however, it has always been asymmetrical, with the much larger
United States overshadowing and influencing internal Cuban politics. To best
understand the decline in relations between Cuba and the United States, attention must
be paid to their historical relationship starting with the establishment of the Monroe
Doctrine in 1823. The Monroe Doctrine stated that,
We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing
between the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should
consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion
of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety (Monroe 1823).

This was the United State's announcement to colonial rivals Britain and Spain, that the
United States could intervene in regional affairs for issues of national security. The
doctrine issues a warning against the establishment of new colonies that could threaten
the regional power of the United States. This doctrine ultimately paved the way for the
United States to intervene in Cuba's battle against Spain, though it would not become
relevant again for almost a century.
It is Cuba's colonial past that is a great factor of influence when considering why the
country did not wish to have the United States involved in their internal politics.
Historically, Cuba had been controlled by the British and the Spaniards. The brutality of
living under Spanish rule had caused the Cuban's to attempt to rebel countless times
during the 19th century, each resulting in large loss of Cuban life and none resulting in
freedom from colonial rule. The United States, fearing the close proximity Spain,
decided to intervene in the Cuban war for independence, and by 1898, the United
States, with the help of Cuban rebels, successfully forced Spain to cede control of
Cuba. Although the Spanish-American war represented the second time the United
States had assisted Cuba in overthrowing a colonial ruler (as they had done to Britain
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years earlier), it was the first time the United States decided to maintain a lasting
influence, and presence within Cuba.
While the U.S. was a helpful component to Cuba’s victory over Spain in their war for
independence, it was the subsequent introduction of the Platt Amendment in the Cuban
Constitutional Assembly, and the wave of government corruption and instability that
followed as a result of continued U.S. influence in Cuba, which pushed the populace
away from wanting any more U.S. intervention in Cuba. After the U.S. helped Cuba win
their war for independence against Spain, the United States decided against inviting
Cuba to the negotiation table. Instead, the United States and Spain agreed on the end
terms of the war without representatives from Cuba present, and the United States
maintained a military presence within Cuba. The Cuban war for independence left
Cubans once again without full control of their sovereignty. Cubans no longer wanted to
be commanded by a colonial ruler, but unfortunately, when Spain relinquished their
control over Cuba, the United States filled their place to form a neo-colony.
Even before the Cuban flag ever flew over Havana in the newly liberated country of
Cuba in 1902, the United States had inserted their mark into politics. The Platt
Amendment was written into the Cuban constitution in 1901, imposed under the threat
of continued U.S occupation. The amendment restricted Cuban sovereignty, granting
the U.S the power to intervene in Cuba militarily and politically in order to “preserve
Cuban independence.” It also granted the U.S the right to establish its naval base at
Guantanamo Bay. Even though the U.S was no longer physically occupying Cuba, it still
held a domineering, neo-colonial presence in the political and economic sphere.
Government officials and politicians in Cuba maintained close relations with
Washington. On more than one occasion the U.S. intervened in elections to support
certain candidates who favored strengthening ties with Washington. The United States
interventions varied in scale and scope, including a reoccupation of Havana from 19061909, the sending of warships into Havana Bay, and keeping U.S. marines in Cuba to
protect U.S. property.
Cuban domestic politics would bear the largest burden of United States influence
though. Over the next two decades, the Platt Amendment arguably created the
necessary conditions under which revolutionaries could gain support, and mobilize
popular sentiments toward political and economic change. The political conditions that
existed after the passing of the Platt Amendment was polarized and fractured, with
Cubans standing politically divided on issues of American intervention. By the 1930's,
the political and economic landscape in Cuba was drastically altered by the consistent
meddling of Washington into Cuban affairs. Leading up to the Cuban Revolution,
“…U.S. capital controlled over 40% of the Cuban sugar industry, 23% of all nonsugar
industry, 90% of all telephone and electronic services, and 50% of Cuba’s railway
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services….” (Sweig, 19). In essence, the U.S. controlled the major aspects of the Cuban
economy. This overbearing U.S. presence could not be maintained if Cubans ever
wanted to experience sovereignty. After a series of U.S. interventions into elections, the
regime in Cuba became more entangled with the mafia, corruption, and overall
disregard for Cubans basic human rights.
In 1933, Gerado Merchado, the U.S. supported dictator of Cuba was overthrown by a
force of university students, military officers (both commissioned and
noncommissioned), and organized labor movements (LeoGrande 9). The newly
established government promised social reform in all areas of politics and the economy,
including the start of social welfare programs. This severely threatened U.S. interests,
particularly in the economic sector, where U.S. investors were heavily involved. To
counter this revolution, Washington worked together with a man named Fulgencio
Batista, the head of the armed forced, and helped to organize a coup to take down the
new regime. Only three months after the revolutionaries had successfully unseated
Merchado, Batista stormed into power with the backing of the United States. From 1933
to 1944 Batista ruled Cuba. By 1944 Batista lost his re-election, gave over power to the
opposition, and went into exile. Less than a decade later though, Batista campaigned
his way back into Cuba and in 1952 Batista once again seized control over Cuba by
coup. Batista's policies continued to favor the economic elites, while the rest of the
Cuban population struggled through relentless poverty.
The U.S. supported Batista even though his policies included the suspension of
constitutional rule, corruption, dealings with the mafia, and overall favoring of the elite
class. His brutality as a leader oppressed majority of the Cuban people, and opposition
against Batista mounted as police repression increased. As long as Batista continued to
satisfy U.S. political and economic interests though, the U.S. continued to support his
blatantly cruel regime.
This is when a key figure in shaping Cuba's contemporary history emerged. Fidel
Castro, a young lawyer who was directly influenced and inspired by revolutions and riots
occurring in other Latin American and Caribbean countries, was the dominant force
behind the 26th of July movement, as well as the overall Cuban Revolution. On July
26th,1953, Castro attempted an attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago, Cuba, as
a means of targeting Batista's army. While he did not succeed, during his trial for
sedition Castro blasted Batista's regime. His speech gained him popularity with the
Cuban people, and his famous closing lines, "Condemn me, It does not matter. History
will absolve me" transformed him into a national hero. Castro, who had grown up in a
poverty stricken, rural area of Cuba, understood what inequality meant for most
Cubans. His sympathy for the poor, and his love for Cuba made him a fervent
nationalist, and champion for social reforms that included social programming aimed at
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fighting poverty, and giving Cuba greater independence from U.S. influence. To the
U.S., Castro was a dangerous man who's revolution was at odds with their economic
and political interests. Under the umbrella of the Cold War, Castro's message of
revolution was radical. According to LeoGrande and Kornbluh, President Eisenhower
was torn on how to position the U.S. on the issues arising in Cuba. While Batista was a
sound, stable ruler who represented Washington's interests well, his regime was brutal
and crumbling. There was little hope of Batista continuing on as dictator. Eisenhower
made the decision to distance the U.S. from Cuba politically, but to many Cubans, this
did little to undo the years of long-standing ties between Batista and Washington
(LeoGrande 10). On January 1st, 1959, Batista fled Cuba. Fidel Castro and other
revolutionary forces, including Ernesto "Che" Guevara, arrived in Havana, solidifying
their revolutionary success.
Though there are varying accounts of the degree to which Fidel Castro was initially
dedicated to supporting Communism, it can be said that Castro was a man of mixed
ideology (Sweig). In fact the Cuban Communist Party (known at the time as the Partido
Socialista Popular), was not fully committed to the revolution until 1958. Castro only
declared himself a Socialist after he was aware of the United States plan to overthrow
the Cuban Revolution. Within the United States though, the Cuban Revolution
represented a very close regional neighbor falling to 'communism'. Under the shadow of
Cold War policies, the Cuban Revolution came as a blow to the United States official
containment policy. Not only was Cuba's regime change seen as threat, the subsequent
attempts made by the United States to recapture Cuba, can only be described as
unsuccessful.
It was in the immediate years following the Cuban Revolution that greatly impacted the
state of current relations. Diplomatic and economic relations continually became worse
over the three year period before diplomatic ties were officially severed in 1961. What
occurred in the preceding years can be characterized by multi and unilateral failures on
both the part of the U.S. and Cuba. At its basic essence, each state placed domestic
and internal issues above maintaining relations, and used the economy as a tool of
intimidation. The first agrarian reforms that Castro put in place in 1959 impacted U.S.
interests, as the largest plantations in Cuba were foreign operated. In response to this,
Congress passed a law giving the president discretionary authority over Cuba's sugar
quota, which was in turn reduced. To counter this law, Cuba nationalized US property.
In response to the changes Castro was making within Cuba, and the damage it was
causing US foreign investors, in October 1960, Washington imposed an export
embargo. A few months later, all diplomats were recalled from Havana, and diplomatic
ties were severed. In the years after diplomatic ties were severed, the US attempted to
overthrow Castro's regime on multiple occasions. This included assassination attempts,
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the Bay of Pigs incidence, Operation Mongoose, and the passing of a full economic
embargo in 1962.
With this historical analysis, it is clear that Cuba's colonial past has a large influence
over how their current politics are conducted. Furthermore, the essence of the Cold War
era cannot be ignored when analyzing why the United States perceived Cuba as such a
large threat. However, the historical relationship between the US and Cuba did not end
with the ending of diplomatic ties. In fact, there have been numerous attempts to
reestablish normalized relations, occurring as early as 1963 which included a successful
release of prisoners from the Bay of Pigs incident. Because of the political climate in
both Cuba and the US, most of these discussions were through back channels, done in
complete secrecy.
The first attempt to reestablish diplomatic relations came under the Kennedy
administration, when French journalist Jean Daniel, who was in Havana in 1963,
transmitted a message from President Kennedy to Castro. This message was later
described by Castro as "a gesture...an indication of a desire to establish contact"
(LeoGrande 42). A mere 72 hours before President Kennedy's assassination, two
messages had been sent to Castro through Jean Daniel, which explained that the US
would end the trade embargo if Castro ended his support for leftist movements in the
region. Daniel would later recall that, "...[Castro] was clearly happy about the message I
was delivering. He would say,' Maybe things are possible with this man'...both Castro
and Kennedy seemed ready to make peace" (LeoGrande 78). After President
Kennedy's assassination, Fidel Castro, fearing his regime would be blamed for the
death reached out to Washington. The goal of Fidel Castro was to signal to the US that
he still wished to continue maintaining open channels, to negotiate diplomatic relations.
The normalization of relations under the Johnson administration failed simply because it
asked too much of Cuba. Some of the demands made included for Castro to sever ties
with the Soviets, to cease all "revolutionary" activities in Latin America, and to enter
talks about indemnification of U.S. business interests. While these negotiations failed,
from this point on, Fidel Castro and his political advisors had contact (in some form) with
every US President and administration up to the present.
President Nixon was one president in which negotiations took a backward turn. This
speaks to the importance of the leadership in terms of allowing for channels to exist
between the US and Cuba. In the case of President Kennedy and Johnson, channels
were open and used, despite no successes occurring in the reestablishment of
relations. President Nixon was one such leader who impeded the normalization process
(much like President George W. Bush in later decades). Nixon, who had met with Fidel
Castro in 1959 while he was Vice President, did not have good personal relations with
Castro. Henry Kissinger, who while serving as Secretary of State attempted to establish
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secret channels by which to talk with Fidel Castro. He later admitted, "I don't even think
I told President Nixon...because Nixon disliked Castro intensely." (LeoGrande 120).
Kissinger, in the midst of his Caribbean Détente, spent 18 months attempting to
negotiate with Cuba, and according to Keohane and LeoGrande, "Kissinger sent Nixon
a memo suggesting the State Department handle all meetings...", to which Nixon
responded, "State has handled this with disgusting incompetence. Their careerists are
Pro-Castro..." (LeoGrance 120).
The following administration, under President Jimmy Carter, had much more success in
dealing with Cuba, though still in the midst of the Cold War, had no success in
establishing relations. In a secret policy briefing done by Carter's foreign policy team, it
was stated that,
There are many compelling reasons why the US should move toward
normalization of relations with Cuba. However, the difficulties in achieving
full normalization of relations should not be minimized...Fidel Castro is a willy
and tough negotiator committed to some goals that are antithetical to those
of the United States. The process of resolving differences with Cuba will be
difficult and tensions and problems will remain even after relations have been
restored (LeoGrande 159).

During the Carter administration, it was Cuba's involvement in Africa which the United
States opposed. The missed opportunity to establish normalized relations included
external involvement in factors that went against US interests. Castro was unwilling to
sacrifice his global aspirations, just as the US were unwilling to sacrifice theirs.
The following US presidents each had similar negotiation processes, each of which
failed due to domestic factors, as well as unwillingness to concede to demands.
President Clinton, who had some success in negotiating change regarding Cuba-US
relations, faced many domestic impediments that initially placed harsher sanctions on
Cuba with the passing of the Cuban Democracy Act. President Clinton personally felt
that, "anybody with half a brain could see the embargo was counterproductive…
Republicans have harvested the Cuban exile vote by snarling at Castro...but no one
bothered to think forward about the consequence" (LeoGrance 269). At the time
however, Florida was an important state to win in terms of electoral votes. Clinton
endorsed the Cuban Democracy Act, which intensified US sanctions during the Cuban
economic collapse by insisting that the embargo would only be lifted if there were
democratic elections in Cuba, and banned all vessels from entering US waters.
However, the bill also stated that there could be an increase in people-to-people
programs, humanitarian assistance (as long as it promoted democratic change) and
increased sales of medicine. Over the course of the Clinton administration, other
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programs that increased communication occurred such as the Baseball Diplomacy
initiative, in which the Oriels played a baseball game against a Cuban team, and
counter narcotics cooperation. What eventually impeded Clinton's efforts to secure
normalization was the Elian Gonzalez issue. Elian was a fife year old boy floating in the
Florida Strait on Thanksgiving Day, 1999. Although the boy had been rescued in the
water, custody of Elian was granted to his relatives in Miami. His father, still in Cuba,
opposed this decision. Eventually, Elian was sent back to his father in Cuba, but the
result was that the Cuban American population felt betrayed by the government, and
ultimately stalled Clinton's strategy of crafting new negotiations.
After reviewing the history of relations between the U.S. and Cuba, the main factors that
contributed to the creation of abnormal relations can be identified as Cuba’s colonial
past, the US presence as an asymmetrical actor within Cuba, corruption, and years of
oppression. Under the threat of the Cold War, Cuba’s revolution was perceived as a
direct threat to the US. Although there have been multiple attempts to reestablish
relations, including the years immediately following the end of official diplomatic
relations, all have failed. Taking these factors into consideration, this analysis proposes
an interesting question, why is there such an effort occurring to reestablish diplomatic
relations now, after decades of failed attempts. What conditions currently exist that are
making normalization possible now?

Section 2: Why is normalization happening now?
“Obama Should End the Embargo on Cuba” read the title of an early and rather direct
New York Times editorial in October 2014, signaling the openly shifting disposition of
not only the editorial board, but of many Americans in the face of what was soon to be
an increased dialogue on diplomatic ties between the US and Cuba. Not at all a secret
was the arrest of Alan Grossman in December 2009, however, between that time and
the time of this editorial, the political reality had changed very little (the only event of
serious international consequence being the easing of restrictions for Cubans to leave
the country). Of further interest, following this editorial in October were a barrage of
opinion pieces and other articles from the New York Times regarding the state of USCuban diplomatic relations. Pieces such as “The Shifting Politics of Cuba Policy” and
“On Cuba Embargo, It’s the U.S. and Israel Against the World — Again” began popping
up frequently in the press, marking a mutating discourse on the contentious issue.
Compare this tone with that of a September 2012 article entitled “Where is Cuba
Going?” by John J Sullivan. After describing the post-Bush changes in travel restrictions
and capital flows between the US and Cuba, the author claimed that the future of the
relationship remained increasingly uncertain. In the midst of this assessment, the author
takes time to question the political leadership of Cuba in discussing the potential of a
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continued Fidel led government. Further, the author had a number of explicit concerns
about the continued communist government.
In many cases, you have a situation in which the family is first wiring money over,
then shipping the goods. The money is used on the other side to pay the various
fees associated with getting the stuff. So it’s as if you’re reaching over and rebuying the merchandise for your relatives. The money, needless to say, goes to
the government.

The author continues to make a number of observations on the considerable penumbra
which continues to obfuscate US-Cuban relations. It seems that at this time, a more
measured, less optimistic view of the situation dominated this press source.
Some question remains as to why The New York Times paid such particular, positive
interest to this topic only a scant few months prior to President Obama’s announcement
of restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba in December, 2014, especially since
there had been relatively little seemly occurring prior to this. Regardless, The New York
Times had been closely following this turn of events prior to it even occurring. Because
of this, its articles detailing eventualities can be useful for constructing a more detailed
time frame.
Merely a week after the president’s announcement, the Times began addressing issues
related to the economic benefits of more normal relations with an article titled “Cuba’s
Zeal for Tight Control Casts a Pall on New Markets” on December 23rd. In it, questions
were posed as to the extent to which trade will benefit Cuba given its dense
bureaucratic barriers.
Yet according to many economists, President Obama’s plan to allow more
interaction between the two countries may not be the lifeline Cuba is hoping for
— unless Cuba overcomes its resistance to change as well.

By this time, Cuba had already been predicted to require reconciling an economic
growth-economic control dichotomy. While less technologically contingent forms of
commerce (such as tourism, cigars, alcohol) were predicted to bolster the Cuban
economy, major Cuban development was being forecast as a long-term requirement at
this time. Here, we can see early questions about the extent of US commitment to
meaningful normalization goals.
Between December 25th 2014 and January 9th 2015, The New York Times is heavily
focused on Cuban human rights concerns. These included the release of political
prisoners, internet access, the effects of normalization on Cuban dissidents, the
suppression of public protests, and the multiple arrests of Cuban performance artist and
protester Tania Bruguera. On January 2nd, a piece entitled “Despite Thaw, American
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Base at Guantanamo still Stings for Cubans” discussed the unresolved negotiations for
return of the Guantanamo land back to Cuba, a political issue which continues at this
current time of authorship (and is likely to continue in the future). On January 10th, The
Times published a piece about celebrations in Miami due to false alarm about Fidel
Castro’s death, setting an interesting tone in regards to many Americans’ view of the
former and current Cuban leadership. January 15th-17th discuss the high demand for,
and easing of access for, Americans wishing to visit Cuba. January 18th-20th reported
on the arrival of Senators Patrick Leahy, Debbie Stabenow and Richard Durbin to
discuss international cooperation and disagreements. During their visit, they found time
to meet with Cuban dissidents, which some speculate led to President Raul Castro
failing to attend a meeting with them. January 21st saw the news of the US outpost in
Cuba becoming a “full-fledged embassy” in the article “US Outpost in Cuba to Step Out
of the Shadows”. The Times released an article the next day stating that Cuban officials
were wary of the US policy to accept Cuban immigrants for residency after one year of
reaching US soil. The Cuban argument was against the incentivization of “dangerous
sea journeys”. January 30th discussed a senate proposal to lift all travel restrictions
between the US and Cuba. February 2nd-6th described many of the domestic concerns
facing the normalization process including support/opposition, legal protection for
Cuban immigrants, politics, etc. February 18th reported in the administrative lifting of
many travel restrictions (except tourism and health care). At time of authorship,
February 25th is the most recent, significant New York Times article which discusses
the raising of American remittance to Cubans and the increase in Cuban private
business.
Section 3: What can we learn from previous diplomatic normalizations
In light of previous US endeavors to normalize relations with hostile countries, critical
information can be induced with regards to current efforts with Cuba. Specifically,
special attention can be paid towards the unfolding of such processes with China in the
midst of the Cold War and Vietnam after the Vietnam War. Comparing these
occurrences for patterns of expected behavior will likely yield insights for an evaluation
of US-Cuban normalization.
In addition to the obvious similarities (all three countries have experienced abnormal
diplomatic relations), there exist a number of other striking commonalities linking the
three cases of China, Vietnam, and Cuba. To start, it would likely be a serious oversight
to ignore the colonial histories of these countries. These are nations who have
institutional and cultural memories of western influence. The response to this history
has often been a rejection to, and in some cases isolation from, western political and
economic consensus. Second, all three countries have had revolutions in the 20th
century. While the nature of the revolutions have been both a positive and negative
force towards normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba, the instability is critical to
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consider in regards to maintaining a predictable base of leadership (which is perhaps a
requirement to successful normalization of relations). The leads to the third similarity, all
three nations have a communist history. Arguably, this is single most important aspect
of the abnormal relations with the US given US interests and policy during the Cold
War. Lastly, all three countries have experienced very difficult relations with the US.
This is not to say that these countries are without their differences. In making any sort of
analysis or comparison, scrutiny ought to be employed where these differences are
pertinent or relevant. First, unlike Vietnam or China, Cuba has always been of strategic
importance to the United States. Evidence of this can be seen with the issuing of the
Monroe Doctrine in 1823, in which the US took initiative to prevent external (European
predominantly) interference in the Western Hemisphere. Because Cuba was one of the
few American nations still under European control, it can be argued that this doctrine
was targeted largely towards it. Second, Vietnam is in the unique position of being the
only country of these three to have had regular US armed forces occupying its borders
(barring the Bay of Pigs Invasion). This is interesting because of the three, Vietnam has
historically posed the least interest to the US (economically and strategically). Lastly,
the sheer size of China and its resource potential leaves it in an entirely different caliber
from Cuba and Vietnam. Given the economic opportunity imbedded in normalized
relations with China, it can be argued that China posed a relatively tremendous obstacle
in maintaining its lack of normalized relations.
Contemporary US-China relations began to decline with the establishment of Mao
Zedong’s People’s Republic of China in 1949. This decline was accelerated by a
century of prior, growing anti-western attitude. Genuinely abnormal diplomatic relations
became pronounced in decades that followed the founding of the PRC with conflict over
Korea, in which the only diplomatic relation between the US and China came in the form
of episodic peace talks over the conflict (Office of the Historian).
Further conflict over Taiwan exacerbated the political tension between China and the
US, which in 1955 passed the Formosa Resolution, vowing and prioritizing the defense
of Taiwan. For a brief period of time in the early 1960’s, diplomatic relations seemed to
be improving with the political separation of the USSR and the People’s Republic of
China as well as a mention by the Assistant Secretary of State that the Kennedy
Administration may have been considering more normalized relations.
Unfortunately, no overt course was ever taken to fulfil this notion. Any plans of long-term
reconciliation were sunk with the US involvement in the Vietnam War and the
successful completion of the PRC’s nuclear weapons program in 1964. Again, a brief
window for potential diplomatic discussion opened in the early 1970’s with the Nixon
administration reevaluating its containment policy towards the PRC and the continuation
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of meetings between U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors. These were again ceased after
US military involvement in Cambodia.
Over two decades of strained (and often nonexistent) diplomacy had a clear undertone
that both sides sought an improvement of relations, however, neither seemed willing to
make the long-term political concessions necessary in the midst of the Cold War. Brief
improvement would be swiftly reduced again as each nation made political maneuvers
to advance their current agendas in a sort of wave pattern. This was turned around,
seemingly by chance, when American Table Tennis athlete Glenn Cowan, practicing for
the 31st World Table Tennis Championship in Japan in 1971, missed his team bus and
was invited by Chinese players to ride on their own. After a gift exchange and some
intensive media coverage of Cowan and some of the other Chinese athletes, the US
team was invited to China, thus opening the door to further communication the likes of
which hadn’t been seen in decades.
The immediate, formal discussion between the US and Chinese governments took
place via clandestine meetings in order to address the lingering obstacles to further
diplomatic ties. In order to do this, Henry Kissinger (a National Security Advisor at the
time) traveled to China in order to prepare the table for more open, formalized
communication. When asked about how the State Department viewed this process
initially, former State Department official Charles Freeman stated,
There were a great number of other things going on, of course. Part of the
business of attempting rapprochement with china was the dismantling of a series
of niggling but long-standing trade and investment barriers, resisted fiercely by
the different elements of the bureaucracy that had acquired a vested interest in
these
things over the course of more than two decades. (Tucker, p.241, 2001)

During this period of initial re-communication, there existed a number of peripheral and
critical issues. Most pressing among these was the issue of Taiwan, which had
remained a point of consistent political tension. When strategizing ping-pong diplomacy,
Kissinger and the Nixon administration operated in relatively secrecy. This was to avoid
the potential for media and/or congress to instill the sort of limitations that come with
publicity in advance. In other words, the State Department sought as much unilateral
power as possible in order to ensure the success of the earliest negotiations (Tucker,
p.243, 2001).
Kissinger’s success in these critical negotiations was directly responsible for the visiting
of President Nixon to Beijing in 1972. Here, Nixon met with Mao Zedong in order to sign
the Shanghai Communiqué. This solidified several resolutions to a broad variety of
issues between the US and China. Most importantly it included a peaceful solution to
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the Taiwan issue as well as a statement of cooperation in the face of the Soviet Union.
By most standards, this was the proper start to normalized relations.
By 1973 diplomatic offices were established in Beijing and Washington to serve as
liaison posts. Although further normalization was slowed due to domestic perturbations
in both countries (the Watergate scandal, Mao Zedong’s death), progress was
accelerated by the rise of Deng Xiaoping in China. After making significant headway
with the Carter Administration, normalized diplomatic relations were fully restored. This
was immediately evidenced by the establishment of embassies, the visiting of Deng
Xiaoping to the US, and a series of economic barrier dismantlings in 1979. Although
there remained a number of tension points between the two countries through the
1980’s, there existed full intergovernmental communication and an air of positive
negotiation.
As mentioned previously, of particular cultural importance to normalized relations was
Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the US in 1979. Harry E. T. Thayer, a member of the
Department of State at the time, reflects on the extremely positive response to this visit
as he discussed the “euphoria” about China at the time. Stating that “it was important
that we help contribute to an atmosphere of increased warmth in the relationship”,
Thayer then continues to argue that he believed China was “oversold” to the American
public at the time (Tucker, p. 327, 2001). Thayer mentions the variety of infamous civil
rights issues that occurred after this time, such as the Tiananmen Massacre, as
examples of why the initial cultural excitement was perhaps premature. Former US
diplomat Arthur Hummel adds that the onset excitement led to a wave of “some 20
agreements of all kinds: trade, scientific relations, technology, exchange of persons, a
Fulbright agreement, and various other”. However, the economic benefits to the
Chinese fell short of their expectations at the time while the US was exposed to some of
the more “unlovely, unpleasant” aspects of Communist China. This most usually
manifested as the somewhat unpredictable, and sometime damaging, actions of high
ranking party officials whose actions would sometimes recklessly hurt American
business interests.
As was the case with China, the re-establishment of Vietnam-US diplomatic relations
was a long process, heavily shrouded in Cold War ideology. What was fundamentally
different than with the situation in China was the POW-MIA war status of many US
military members, and other damning remnants of the Vietnam War. This made
establishing diplomatic relations even more difficult, particularly when coupled with
Vietnam's involvement in Cambodia during the 1970's, as well as Vietnam's reliance on
Russia as an aid donor. According to David Elliot in his book Changing Worlds, which
discusses Vietnam's transition into integration in the global economy, he states that,
Vietnam's transition from 1975 to 2005 was gradual, but punctuated with
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sharp discontinuities; first the conflict with China and Cambodia in the late
1970s, the economic reforms of 1986, and the end of the Cold War in 1989,
and the reapproachment with China in 1991. But the big turning points in
the ideological shifts have been fairly distinct. (Elliot, pg. 8, 2012)

The deterioration of US-Vietnam relations was greatly affected by the Vietnam war.
After the unification of Vietnam in 1976, and the resulting regime changes, the United
States ceased all diplomatic ties with Vietnam. Sanctions were established, and the US
placed a trade embargo on Vietnam. Relations further deteriorated when, in the late
1970s, Vietnam became involved in the conflict in Cambodia, an action which drew US
forces into Cambodia. Like the situation in China, after the deterioration of relations,
there was a concerted effort by both actors to reestablish diplomatic ties. Lack of
compromise on both parties, coupled with tensions created under the global bipolar
political climate, did not An article published in Foreign Affairs in 1978 highlights the
issues the US and Vietnam faced when attempting to negotiate diplomatic ties;
...within hours of the Paris meeting's conclusion when the U.S. House
of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to bar the government from
negotiating "reparations, aid or any other form of payment" to Vietnam.
Subsequent votes in the House reaffirmed the existence of strong opposition
to any form of aid and even to a lifting of the trade embargo. Positions of both
the Vietnamese and U.S. governments hardened. The Vietnamese made it clear
they would not budge from their view that U.S. "contributions to healing the
wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction" were "an undeniable obligation,"
while the Carter Administration indicated that the aid requested by Hanoi was
out of the question. The Paris negotiations, which resumed in June in a gloomy
atmosphere, reached an impasse over the aid issue;" ( Foreign Affairs, 1978)

Similar to that of Cuba, there had been previous attempts to normalize relations, but no
policy window was present in order for these negotiations to find success. This article
emphasizes the lack of domestic political will within Vietnam and the US to move
forward with the normalization process. The U.S. House of Representatives and the
government body in Vietnam were also involved in the failure of the establishment of
diplomatic relations, as each saw the issue as non-negotiable. As in Cuba, the will of
the leadership is an important aspect in building communication channels through which
normalization can begin to occur.
More contemporary US-Vietnam relations began again after the fall of the Soviet Union
in 1989. By the early 1990s, the President George H.W. Bush administration began the
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process of normalization with Vietnam. The first order of business was to resolve the
issues dating back to the Vietnam war, involving the POW'S and members missing in
action (MIAs). The first presence the U.S. government had in Vietnam since 1975 was
the U.S. Office for Prisoners of War/MIA Affairs, which opened in Hanoi in 1991.
Relations continually began to improve over the year, and later in 1991, when Vietnam's
troops withdrew from Cambodia, the political climate in the U.S. became more receptive
and invested in the idea of normalization. By 1995, the U.S. set up liaison offices in
Hanoi, and Vietnam set up offices in Washington, signifying both countries were ready
to fully embark on the process of normalization. President Bill Clinton announced
normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam on July 11, 1995, and secretary of state
Warren Christopher flew into Hanoi to oversee the opening of the U.S. Embassy in
Hanoi, and the U.S. consulate general's office was opened in 1999. Like the case with
China, though these offices were opened, and diplomatic relations were normalized,
there still exists many points of contention that both states have worked to resolve since
1991. Also like China, the official establishment of relations between the U.S. and
Vietnam was preceded by a series of smaller diplomatic steps; the opening of
embassies, and offices in both countries.
While in China the process of opening up discussions with the US began with the
invitation of the US table tennis team to China, the opening up of discussion between
Vietnam and the US began with China's reacceptance of Vietnam in 1991. The moment
when diplomatic relations were once again restored between US and Vietnam, came
almost simultaneously with Vietnam's acceptance into ASEAN. Because the U.S. has
established relations with China, and most other countries in ASEAN, the step to
reestablishing diplomatic ties with Vietnam was logical in terms of moving forward
economically. Vietnam’s acceptance by ASEAN, and the thawing of relations between
Vietnam and China, escalated the issue of normalization with Vietnam to become once
again in the best interest of the US. Currently, the US is in a similar situation with Cuba,
in regards to the Summit of the Americas meetings. Due to resentment from other
leaders surrounding the lack of US policy support regarding Cuba, it was in the United
States best interest to begin opening dialogue with Cuba. The patterns that emerge in
regards to the normalization process that occurred in China and Vietnam can be traced
in Cuba as well. Though each country has unique attributes, the overall normalization
process, the consistent starting and stopping of dialogue, how relations became
abnormal, and the act of reestablishing diplomatic ties through leadership initiatives,
follows through to current processes occurring between Cuba and the US.
Section 4: An evaluation of the current normalization process
Although inherently international in nature, and arguably endowed to discuss with
international relations or comparative political theory, the purpose of this research is to
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make consideration for, and to focus on, the specific drivers of diplomatic normalization
and other potential policy change. We recognize the influence of other countries on the
dyadic relationship between the US and Cuba, as well as the changes that have
affected Cuba internally, however, we are more focused on how these issues are
mediated within the US. We have opted to consider this process through this lense
because our primary focus is in determining the evolution of US foreign policy in regards
to Cuba. For this reason we will, generally, be holding Cuba as a sort of international
constant, one which defaults to a position of attempting to normalize relations. This
assumption is made with the understanding the even Fidel Castro has been reaching
out to past US presidents for decades. As was previously demonstrated, “back
channels” existed between the US and Cuba beginning immediately after the breaking
of diplomatic ties. These channels existed through traditional methods, through the CIA,
and between the President’s administration and Castro, and through non-traditional
methods such as media and news reporters. Castro’s acceptance of US “gestures” as
he referred to the communications between himself and various US administrations,
was mirrored by his own attempts to engage in discussions. Because of these attempts
made by Castro to reach out to the US, beginning with President Kennedy, all the way
up to the current administration, Cuba can be held constant in analyzing the relationship
between US and Cuba, within the context of US foreign policy.
To this end, we will be examining most closely the domestic components of
normalization of dyadic relations with foreign states previously “on bad terms” with the
US. From a theoretical standpoint, the multiple streams framework can be applied to
this evaluation (Protopsaltis, 2011). This theory categorizes three typically autonomous
components (or streams) which can be thought of as “flowing through” the policy
making machine on a systemic level. These streams are problems, policies, and
politics. Given proper perturbations or moments, these streams can come together in
order to improve the attention and resources allocated to addressing an issue. These
moments are known as “policy windows” and can be unexpected/regular and
external/internal. For example, the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 are considered a major
unexpected, external policy window which induced the formation of the Department of
Homeland Security. Alternatively, the ending of a president’s term could be considered
a regular, internal policy window. Policy windows are typically taken advantage of via
policy entrepreneurs (generally well-situated political actors of all sorts) though the
deliberate manipulation of the convergence of the three streams. Our analysis will follow
this framework while paying special attention to independent variables that affect any of
the three (problems, policies, and politics) streams.
The Problems
While more or less speaking for itself, the problem of abnormal diplomatic relations has
a degree of depth which enables it to remain both persistent and consequential. Often,
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as we have seen with China-US and Vietnam-US, this rut cannot be overcome without
one or both sides having meaningful negotiations and making serious concessions.
Typically, both sides would benefit from more normalized relations, but without a policy
window opportunity arising, negotiations will result in a “Lawnmower Effect”. With this
effect, we observe one or both nations in a pairing attempting to reopen diplomatic ties,
in an effort to normalize relations, only to fail due to the endurance of underlying political
issues. Efforts to initiate an opening of normalized diplomatic relations will face longterm, and ultimately, terminal obstacles with respect to the preferences and norms of
the states involved. Despite these failures, and because of the vested interest both
states have in maintaining normalized relations, efforts repeatedly fail and start again
over the course of decades until some sort of policy window provides the correct
circumstances for lasting negotiations. In the two cases discussed thus far, this has
been in the rejection of opposing political systems and consensuses.
The Policies
On its own, this stream can be thought of as solutions looking for problems. In regards
to normalization, these solutions come in a variety of forms, depending on the political
actor who is promoting it. With respect to Cuba currently, there are three prevailing
policies in the US political arena. First, there is the sentiment that until Cuba abandons
its communist institutions, no concerted effort should be made to reconcile diplomatic
issues. This view is adopted for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to the
belief that resuming relations with Cuba endorses the activities of the Cuban
government, that the current trade and political isolation is a show of support for the
activists participating in Cuba, and that the US ought to be sensitive to the historical ties
of many Cuban Americans to Cuba. The second popular policy alternative is that of
complete, fully realized diplomatic normalization. Proponents of this policy argue that
economic warfare harms all those who engage, that the international political
ramifications of abnormal relations with Cuba make interactions with other Central and
South American governments more difficult, and that the true cause of the abnormal
relations is history long passed. At time of authorship, there obstacle facing proponents
of this policy is the timing and extent of US concessions to Cuba in order to achieve
policy goal. The final major policy alternative is something of a hybrid. Its supporters
argue that a partial, though long-term movement towards normalization is most
appropriate. This alternative comes in many forms depending on the area of the
abnormal relationship. For example, some would propose only lifting the travel
restrictions, while others would seek an increase in capital flows, etc.
The Politics
This stream is mostly concerned with system wide political conditions. This refers to
interest groups, public sentiment, and political developments (legislative and executive
changes). Gallup polling dating as far back as 1974 has sought to explore and quantify
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US public sentiment in regards to Cuba. In summary, the results tend to illustrate a
movement away from the demonization of Cuba and hold public support for an ending
of the embargo, and a re-establishment
establishment of diplomatic relations, in the majority. When
asked about their overall opinion of Cuba in February 2015, 39% of respondents said
“very favorable” while only 16% responded with “very unfavorable”. These are the
highest and lowest percentages
tages for their respective categories on record. Compare this
with a mere 8% of respondents who viewed Cuba as “very favorable” in 1996. When
asked in February 2015 whether respondents favored or opposed the ending of the
trade embargo against Cuba, a majo
majority
rity 59% were in favor of ending the embargo. This
is compared to a mere 29% who were opposed to ending the embargo. Most
importantly, historically, when asked whether respondents were in favor or opposed to
re-establishing
establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, US support has stayed consistently
above 50%, reaching a percentage high of those in favor of 71%. The exception to this
is April 1996, when the percentage of those in favor of re
re-establishing
establishing diplomatic
relations fell to 40%. Even still, the percentage of those opposed to re-establishing
establishing
diplomatic relations in 1996 remained below 50%.

"Americas--Cuba." Gallup. Gallup, Inc, n.d. Web. 26 Mar. 2015.

Some of the earliest and most vocal opposition to the recent shift towards US-Cuban
US
diplomatic normalization has come from US Republican Senator Marco Rubio. In a
statement sharply criticising President Obama’s foreign policy in late 2014, Senator
Rubio claimed that “What these changes are going to do is, they will tighten this
regime’s [Castro’s] grip on power for decades to come” (Levy, 2014). Rubio then
continued to state that he would block any attempt to finance a Cuban embassy or
appoint a Cuban ambassador. While the disposition of a single, albeit influential,
senator says very little about the larger poli
political
tical scene, an evaluation of some of the
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interest groups behind this political actor could reveal the attitudes of some pertinent
interest groups. This can be done by considering the types of organizations that actively
support Rubio’s agenda through campaign financing. While we acknowledge that not all
contributors offer funds solely because of Rubio’s stance on Cuba, we believe that
these interests are at least not diametrically opposed to his stance on normalization
either. Looking at contributions for Rubio’s 2010 run for US Senate, we find many of the
expected, out-of-state (out of Florida) type of political committees such as
Sequa/Chromalloy PAC (an air transport group) and Plainscapital Corporation PAC (a
banking group) (opensecrets.org). However, we also find a number of in-state interest
groups providing significant funding to Senator Rubio. These include the Florida
Association of Realtors, Florida Association of Mortgage Brokers, Harmony Health
Systems, and the Florida Chamber of Commerce. While many of the interest groups
represent business interests, we also find a number of other interest groups such as the
Southern Strategy Group and the Florida Police Benevolent Association
(followthemoney.org). It is worth considering however that one of the top contributors to
Rubio over the past five years has been the Club for Growth, a free-market, free
enterprise organization. It is conceivable that this group has strategized that enabling a
socialist market to exist in Cuba is a greater threat to its mission than deliberately
creating barriers to trade with that market. Furthermore, the primary type of industry
contributing to Rubio is retired peoples. This suggests significant backing from a
typically older population, perhaps one more personally connected to the fairly recent
conflict between the US and Cuba.
In regards to political turnover, much can be said about the historical relationship
between the US Congress and the Office of the President. The last US president to
make concerted efforts towards normalizing relations with Cuba was President Bill
Clinton. According to LeoGrande and Kornbluh, the Clinton era was the last
administration to successfully produce lasting changes on the relationship between
Cuba and the US. The successful negotiations of the normalized migration accords in
1994 and 1995, as well as the expansion of people-to-people linkages which opened
educational and cultural exchanges, have rebuilt some bridges between the two
governments. Even though the two governments remained estranged, the dialogue
between them increased to produce lasting achievements. However, Clinton’s efforts
met staunch opposition with Republican majorities in both the House and Senate for
almost his entire time in office. Alternatively, President Obama has faced mixed
Congressional support with a Republican House and Democratic Senate. However, as
mentioned previously, public sentiment towards this issue has also changed in recent
years.To this end, the issue is seemingly less partisan than during the Clinton
Administration with Republicans like Senator Jeff Flake actively supporting the
normalization of Cuban-US relations (Levy, 2014).
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The Policy Window
The recent and serious attention to US-Cuban relations, especially in light of the burst of
recent activity surrounding the issue, suggests we are (at time of authorship) in the
midst of some sort of policy window. While the policy window is an important component
of the explanatory logic behind the multiple streams framework, it is often difficult to
isolate precisely what a policy window is while in the middle of it. For this reason, it may
become clearer in the future what is contributing to the merging of the political, problem,
and policy streams. We identify four potential reasons why this policy window has
opened. First, with the abdication of Fidel Castro, there may be a changed perception of
the Cuban regime in the US generally. Second, with Venezuela’s recent economic
downturn, Cuba may be in a position to re-approach a political discussion with the US
more constructively. Third, a decrease in the saliency of Cuban-Americans may be
relatively reducing US domestic opposition to normalization. Forth, it is possible that the
Allen Gross prisoner exchange provided the proper spark between governments in both
countries to consider opening negotiations.

After the 1998 presidential election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the relationship
between Venezuela and Cuba became one of patron and provider. This ultimately led to
the interdependence we see between the two countries (Piccone and Trinkunas, 2014).
This manifested as the provision of subsidized oil to Cuba by Venezuela in return for
skilled Cuban labor, military backing, and friendly diplomatic relations. In regards to the
energy/labor partnership, Cuba pays for 60% of Venezuelan oil in the first 90 days. The
remaining 40% is financed by Cuba at a 1% interest rate over a 25 year period. This is
partly facilitated by Cuba’s role as a Petrocaribe state. Petrocaribe is a Caribbean oil
agreement in which member states receive preference for Venezuelan oil (The
Economist). This is of note because almost two-thirds of Cuba’s oil supply was
composed of Venezuelan oil imports in 2011 alone. In return for this lucrative energy
subsidization, tens of thousands of Cuban laborers were to work in Venezuela.
By most accounts, there are 40,000 Cuban professionals in Venezuela,
75 percent of whom are healthcare workers.14 Civilian personnel, such
as doctors and teachers, are deployed as part of a network of social
assistance programs in Venezuela known as misiones, focused on basic
community health, sports, and literacy programs (Piccone and Trinkunas,
2014)

In regards to security and diplomacy, the relationship had been one in which Cuba
provides significant aid to Venezuelan strategy and security plans. This includes the
presence of hundreds of military advisors, the presence of Cuban armed forces liaison
detachments, and the adoption of a Cuban military doctrine. Diplomatically, Venezuela
and Cuba built strong relations under the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
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States (CELAC), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), and
Petrocaribe, mentioned previously.
In reviewing this relationship, a number of things become clear. First, there existed a
serious imbalance of trade and security between the two countries; with Venezuela
providing only oil and Cuba providing a wide array of critical services, it becomes clear
how this relationship becomes damaged with a perturbation in Venezuelan oil exports.
Furthermore, the close partnership, while exceptionally profitable in the short-term, has
limits on long-term development in both nations as it constrains broadening of its
alternative trade partnerships. Lastly, the close control Cuba places on Venezuelan
security limits Venezuela’s political autonomy.
After the fall of Cuba’s first economic and political patron, the Soviet Union, in 1991,
Cuba’s economy contracted by 35% (Gupta, 2014). Given the recent extended low oil
prices and the lack of Venezuelan finances generally, it comes as no surprise that the
contemporary Cuban-Venezuelan relationship has been coming to an end. Once
Venezuela ceases its oil subsidization at a level beneficial to Cuba, we can expect to
see a more drastic reduction in Cuban services to Venezuela in return. Since this
agreement represents the center of the relationship, its end will result in alternative
political-economic policies for both countries. What makes this more interesting is that
Chavez and the Castros, in additional to close economic and political ties, were also
close personal friends (Reuters, 2013). Perhaps this, more clearly than anything,
explains the specific timing of the re-opening of US-Cuban diplomatic relations.
Consider that Hugo Chavez’s death was March 5, 2013 while the announcement that
the United States and Cuba would attempt to restore diplomatic ties took place on
December 17, 2014, merely a year and a half afterwards. It is not unreasonable to think
that the mere occupation of Chavez in the office of Venezuela’s presidency could have
dissuaded Cuba from seeking other trade partners. Regardless, the changing
conditions in Venezuela, whether they be purely economic, political, personal, or some
combination of the three, represent a combination of political, problem, and policy
streams conducive to increased efforts to normalize relations between the US and
Cuba.
The Cuban-American lobby has historically been a domestic factor that has impeded
previously attempts at normalization.However, the weakening of the political saliency of
these lobby groups, and the shifting attitudes amongst Cuban-Americans have been
instrumental in contributing to the allowance of the policy window to occur. Strictly in
terms of US domestic politics, the Cuban-Americans in Miami have typically held power
as a voting bloc. While the numbers of Cuban-American immigrants have increased in
years, their political saliency has decreased in regards to national elections. According
to Julia Sweig, in the 2008 presidential election, “Obama won the state of Florida... with
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only 35% of the Cuban vote as a whole, having dominated in the 18-24 cohort. NonCuban Latinos in the state proved much more crucial to Obama's victory….” (Sweig
268). By 2009, Obama had won 49% of the Cuban vote, putting political myths to rest
about the political weight Cuban-American’s hold over Florida in the national elections
(Sweig 268). As the Cuban American lobby is a smaller factor in terms of solidifying the
electoral votes of Florida, any voiced opposition holds less national weight than in
previous years.
Further analysis of the Cuban American population in Miami shows a shift in
demographic as well, which is important to consider when analyzing Cuban American
attitudes toward US-Cuba relations. While the older generation of Cuban American
exiles are staunchly opposed to having any relations with Castro’s Cuba, the younger
generation, and those who arrived in Miami decades after the first wave of Cuban
immigrants, largely do not hold the same view. As was previously discussed, politicians
such as Marc Rubio, who still receives campaign funds from Cuban-American lobby
groups, are receiving money from retired aged citizens, who have a closer connection to
the original US policy stance on Cuba. This does not necessarily represent the interests
of the younger generations, who travel to Cuba yearly. In recent polls taken of CubanAmericans living in Miami that have been conducted by Florida International University,
an obvious difference becomes apparent in terms of acceptance of lifting the US trade
embargo. 68 percent of respondents favor restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba.
However, amongst younger respondents (18-29), 90 percent favored restoring
diplomatic ties. 62% of Cuban Americans between the ages of 18-29 oppose continuing
the embargo. Even further, amongst Cubans entering the United States in 1995 or later,
80% favor a policy shift in regards to the establishment of diplomatic relations (FIU,
2014).
Perhaps if the previously mentioned situations created an environment in which
normalization of US-Cuban relations were possible, then the incarceration and
subsequent release of US citizen Alan Gross by the Cuban government in December
2014 could have created the specific opportunity for dialogue between the two
countries. This would be a policy window not unlike the Ping-Pong diplomacy of the
early 1970’s between the US and China. The situation surrounding the arrest of Alan
Gross is interesting in and of itself in that he was reportedly conducting a clandestine
operation on Cuban soil. He was incarcerated in early December of 2009 on charges of
trying to “undermine the integrity and independence of Cuba” (Council on Foreign
Relations). He was originally designated to Cuba as a subcontractor for the U.S.
Agency for International Development. However, in the course of this endeavor, he
allegedly smuggled satellite phones, computers, and other communication equipment
into Cuba in order to distribute them to the local Cuban population. After only five years
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of his fifteen year sentencing, Gross was returned to the US in a prisoner swap
involving him and three Cuban intelligence officers incarcerated in the US since 1998.
In order to secure such a dealing, secret talks took place between the US and Cuba in
the year leading up to the exchange (Garvin, 2014). These talks took place sometime in
mid 2012 and lasted roughly 18 months. While details are still closely guarded, on a
number of occasions, Presidents Raul Castro and Barack Obama were invited to the
Vatican under the facilitation of Pope Francis. With the offices and resources there, It
would seem that such talks were largely successful beyond the mere discussion of a
prisoner exchange, as President Obama and Raul Castro announced plans to reestablish diplomatic relations shortly thereafter. When two neighboring countries have
only communicated a handful of times over the course of roughly six decades, it makes
sense that Presidents Obama and Castro would make room to discuss other important
issues in addition to the prisoner swap. In this way, this prisoner exchange was taken
full advantage of in order to facilitate additional negotiations between the two countries.

The Policy Entrepreneurs
Consideration ought to be made based on the complete range of key actors involved in
foreign policy. Yang notes in Congress and US China Policy: 1989-1999, that in terms
of the US government, there exist only two major actors in this regard: the Congress
and President. Typically, the Supreme Court has opted out of becoming involved in
such affairs as it views them to be fundamentally “political” (Oetjen v. Central Leather
Company). However, in the few instances in which the Supreme Court has become
involved, it typically holds that it is exclusively the role of the of the president to act on
foreign affairs (Yang, p. 7, 2000). Congress, alternatively, has traditionally had a
fluctuating role in its level of involvement in foreign policy, however, in 1973, with the
passing of the War Powers Resolution, Congress became significantly more involved in
the deployment and withdrawal of US armed forces abroad. This marked increased
congressional commitment to assert its power in politically sensitive international issues.
Recently, Congress has used alternative methods to increase its foreign policy influence
in politically sensitive areas. For example, in an open letter signed by nearly 50 US
senators to the leaders of Iran in March 2015, it was warned that the future of lasting
nuclear negotiations (which are being undergone via the President at time of
authorship) was entirely dependent on the approval of Congress in its capacity to ratify
treaties. While the treaty ratification is not a new power, the assertive demonstration of
political interests to a foreign government is relatively unusual. In light of constituency
theory, which argues that Congress members make single-minded efforts for re-election
(Mayhew, 2004), it becomes somewhat clear that the economic and trade benefits to an
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increase in foreign policy power for Congress gives it leverage to appeal to the interests
of its constituencies (Yang, p. 14, 2000).
Concluding Remarks: Where Do We Stand Now?
In light of the historical analysis of US-Cuba relations, the lessons learned from
previous attempts at normalization, and the evaluation of the current normalization
process, there exists a unique and finite window of opportunity for the occurrence of
successful negotiations. The coming together of problems, politics, and policy streams
has created the conditions under which a policy window has opened. The spark of
discussions that arose through the prisoner exchange presented a chance in which
channels of communication could be re-opened, thus, temporarily halting the
Lawnmower Effect. Furthermore, there exists economic opportunities in the U.S. and
Cuba that are helping to drive negotiations forward. However, this rare policy window
can pass if any of the three streams disconnects from the policy window before the final
stages of normalization can occur.
In terms of the recommendations that can be made based off the findings of this
research, there are still possible sources that could force negotiations away from
establishing normalized relations. The transition from diplomatic relations, to normalized
relations could be affected by negative pressure from third parties, including other
states or interest groups, lack of motivation from US policy makers, and failure to
achieve any progress in current discussions in terms of compromise.

